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Under the traditional system oflivestock production in the U.S., small numbers of
animals have been raised in many different places. Because they were so widely dispersed
it was presumed that the wastes produced caused little environmental degradation.
Livestock production operations are now often large, fewer, and operated on smaller
acreage. This move may have been fueled by economies of scale, specialization, regional
concentrations and many different forces.
Technological change has enabled the hog industry to move hogs indoors, adopt
all-inlall-out production, segregate early weaning, and initiate feeding and terminal
breeding programs (plain). The number of pigs weaned per litter, as reported in the u.s.
Department of Agriculture's December 1996 Hogs and Pigs Report, reflects the
interaction of technology, production efficiency, and firm size. Pigs saved per litter in
1996 by size ofoperation ranged from 7.30 for operations with 1-99 hogs to &.80 for
operations with more than 2000 hogs and pigs. In the U.S. the total number of hog
operations of 157,450 in 1996 is down 13 percent from 1995 and 24 percent from 1994.
During this same period, operations with 2000 or more hogs accounted for 3 percent of
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hog farms and 51 percent of the total inventory.















Source: USDA Hogs and Pigs Report: Final Estimates 1988-1992.
Table 1 shows a progressive decline in the total number of hog operations even as
hog inventory continues to increase.
The U.S. hog industry has also witnessed structural change based upon the
separation of the functions ofownership, management, and labor. This is reflected in the
increasing number ofhogs raised under contract. In 1996 the total number ofhogs under
contract, owned by operations with at least 5000 hogs and pigs but rais,ed by contractees,
accounts for 21 percent of the U.S. hog inventory (USDA). Among the largest hog
producers there has also been some vertical integration, with production, slaughter and
packing as the main activities. As packing plants become larger but fewer, the problem of
proximity is pushing some hog producers farther from competitive markets. The total
number ofhogs slaughtered in the U.S. since the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972 rose
from 85 million that year to 99.2 mimon in 1996. 1
1All production data were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistical Service of
the United States Department of Agriculture.
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u.s. Com Belt hog producers had the largest share ofhog fanns and sales,
although hog fanns in the plains states had the highest average land area (USDA). Among
the top ten hog producing states in the u.s. in 1996 are Iowa, North Carolina, Minnesota,
lllinois and Indiana.
While the total inventory of hogs in the U.S. declined 4 percent between December
] 995 and December 1996, some states registered rapid increases in hog inventory over the
same period: 132 percent in Oklahoma and 263 percent in Utah. Projecting current trends
indicate that North Carolina will overtake Iowa as the top hog producing state in the U.S.
by the year 2000 (plain).
Problem Statement
Wastes from confined animal feeding operations are a major source ofboth point
and nonpoint agricultural pollution. The amount of wastes generated by large
concentrated animal feeding operations is huge. The method of manure storage, the
treatment facilities available and the land application rates generally detennine how the
environment may be affected. The most common manure storage facility used by u.s.
hog producers in 1992 were manure pits, and larger operations tend to locate such
facilities farther from houses, wells and surface water (plain). In many states livestock
wastes may be applied to the land in solid or liquid fonns. When land application is
carried out without regard to time, rate and method, such applications might result in
water quality degradation.
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The public has become increasingly concerned about potential effects of
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAPO) on the environment. The Sparks
Companies Incorporated (SCI) policy report ofMay 15 1997 (pp. 2) aptly states the
frustrations of the citizenry and their elected representatives:
In recent months, North Carolina's (hog industry) growth has led to worsening
environmental problems and growing criticisms of hog farm waste management,
water pollution and odor problems. Not only has much of the luster now gone
from the sub-sector's glamour, but key state officials are actively moving to
restrict future growth, at least temporarily. A bill to halt construction oflarge hog
farms in tbe state was recently introduced in the legislature, a move that has the
backing of the governor who earlier proposed a two-year moratorium on
expanding the booming industry.
Where pollution externalities exist, governments may intervene by developing
policy measures to improve social welfare. One way to control such externalities is the
frequently proposed system ofunit taxes in which the tax is equal to the marginal social
damage. Although such Pigouvian taxes yield Pareto optimal resource allocations in
competitive systems, they are rarely used because the social damage due to pollution is
difficult to measure, and available data are related only to the neighborhood of the
economy's initial position (Hochman and Zilbennan). An alternative strategy (Baumol and
Oates) sets an arbitrary standard of environmental quality and imposes taxes to attain this
standard. This hardly attains a Pareto optimal solution, but it may achieve the desired
level of pollution at minimum cost to the economy.
Since the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972, there has been a spate offederal,
state and local regulations designed to protect the country's water, air and land from
environmental degradation. The Federal Clean Water Act, which prohibits the discharge
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of any pollutants into U.S. waters from point sources, is considered the most significant
legislation impacting u.s. livestock producers (Gates). Such regulations are generally
based on standards, and may not consider the costs ofcompliance or the regulationIS
effectiveness in maintaining high water quality. The regulation costs incurred by
producers often affect economic viability and competitiveness of the livestock industry.
Effe·ctiveness and enforceability of new regulations, as wen as their effects on location,
size, and competitiveness ofthe livestock industry may not be adequately detennined
without reference to compliance cost estimates and information to predict the
effectiveness on water quality (Christensen and Krause).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) retains jurisdiction over some states
in the enforcement of its federal regulations, while it delegates enforcement responsibility
to competent authority in other states. States also develop and enforce regulations for
point and nonpoint sources; many of these programs are voluntary (Letson and Gollehon).
Regulation of livestock operations by individual states has been inconsistent even among
states to which EPA has delegated National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems
CAFO permitting authority (Frarey and Pratt). The existing differences in application and
enforcement of environmental regulation among states combined with natural resource
endowments and taxation policies probably impact the hog industry. The research
question will be: How do differences in livestock waste regulation policies among states
affect location and size ofthe hog industry in the United States?
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Objectives
The general objective of this study is to detennine the impact of differential
application and enforcement offederal, state, and local livestock waste regulation policies
on the growth of the hog industry in some top hog producing states in the US.
The study has the following specific objectives:
1. To develop a matrix ofenvironmental regulations for some major U.S. hog
producing states, drawing out the differences and similarities.
2. To describe some ofthe structural characteristics of the U.S. hog industry,
showing current changes and future developments.
3. To determine the effect ofliv,estock waste regulatory and tax policies on
inventory, location and size of the hog industry.
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CHAPTERll
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptual Framework
Agricultural pollution is a classic case ofexternal diseconomy in which the welfare
loss is uncompensated. Increased per capita income in developed countries has led to
increased d'emand for income-elastic goods such as environmental amenities (Reichelderfer
and Kramer). However because consumers have little independent market power
regarding environmental repercussions offarming, governments intervene as
representatives of non-market demand with regulations designed to internalize the external
costs ofproduction and preserve public goods.
Although taxation has been recognized as a first-best policy that maximizes
producers' and consumers' surpluses in environmental regulation, standards have been
preferred by policy makers because taxes result in lower output and higher prices
(Hochman and Zilberman).
The static deterministic production function is an unidentified mathematical
function ofhog inventory Y. a vector X" ofk non-renewable variable inputs, and a vector
Xi of) natural resource input flows:
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(1)
For a hog operation which also generates a negative externality the second output,
pollution, is represented as:
(2)
Because many livestock waste regulations emphasize reduction in pollution levels rather
than abatement, this model will not include pollution abatement costs. A joint product
profit maximizing hog operation would have the following profit function:
(3)
where Py is the price per hog, Pz is the price (or social cost) of pollution, and Pi, Pk and b
are costs of inputs A:;. and Xk and fixed production costs, respectively. Where the polluting
animal feeding operation remains unregulated, the marginal social cost of pollution
remains unintemalized, and a virtual non-existent cost to the producer. In the regulated
industry it becomes the internalized cost ofpollution. A social welfare analysis can
determine the socially optimum level of pollution., and the optimum penalty to levy when a
finn violates the restrictions. The decision rules under unconstrained profit maximization
indicate that the inputs' values of marginal products are equal to the sum of the value of
marginal damage due to pollution and the price of the input. A solution of tbe
simultaneous first order equations gives an estimate of the socially optimum pollution level
Z·. With this constraint the hog operation's profit maximizing function is given as:
(4)
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No-discharge states would set the sociaHy optimum pollution level at zero, and differential
application ofenvironmental regulations implies that different states would have different
social optima. The finn's marginal cost ofpoUution abatement or the optimum penalty for
non-compliance is A..
The decision rules from (4) would suggest that the hog operations' optimum
pollution level should be equal to the social level. The optimality conditions are supposed
to set a standard for first-best performance. It is however clear that as long as the
optimum pollution level is set without regard to size of operation (assuming this is directly
proportional to amount of pollutant) it would be deemed inefficient. Differential
application of regulations could imply different social optima of pollution level, and,
ultimately diff~rent costs ofcompliance in different states. These influence producer
decisions on where to operate, and how much to produce.
In the absence ofadequate information, standards are however preferred to taxes
because they prevent effluent levels from increasing when costs turn out to be higher than
initial estimates (Spence and Weitzman). Regulations would constrain concentrated
animal feeding operations such that appropriate reductions in pollution are achieved, by
placing restrictions and imposing costs on the regulated industry.
Histodcal Perspective ofUnited States Water
Pollution Control Policy
This non-exhaustive history ofenvironmental regulation in the U.S. livestock
industry dates in recent times to the 1898 Refuse Act. This Act prohibited discharges that
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would hinder navigation, and required federal pennits from the U. S. Chief ofEngineers
for dredging and disposal ofdredged material. With the Water Pollution Control Act of
1948 came the federal government's first move to control water pollution. Although it
reaffirmed state and local responsibility for controlling water pollution, this act initiated
federal government authority to conduct investigations, research and surveys. Tenets of
current water pollution control policy can be recognized in two provisions of the 1956
amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act:
First, federal financial support for the constructing waste treatment plants was
assured. This provision grants municipalities up to 55 percent ofthe cost of constructing
water treatment facilities from federal grants. Second, direct federal regulation ofwaste
discharges was to be put in place. This provision authorizes the designated federal control
authority to convene a conference to deal with any interstate water pollution problem.
The Water Quality Act of 1965 was an attempt to improve on this process by
establishing ambient water quality standards for interstate water courses and by requiring
states to file implementation plans. States responded by drawing up plans that were vague
and did not attempt to link specific effluent standards on discharges to the ambient
standards (Tietenberg).
Present pollution control policy in the U.S. derives from earlier policies and
programs aimed at industrial and municipal sources. Since implementation of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972, agriculture has become a significant
part of the programs (TIAER). Also known as the Clean Water Act, this act divides water
pollution sources into point and non-point categories and sets water quality standards
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which states would eventually implement through regulatory programs (Jones and Sutton).
Whether developed by states or by the Environmental Protection Agency, the essence of
the regulations is to control feedlot runoff, require properly designed earthen structures
with adequate storage, and recommend rates ofmanure application to cropland. The
initial regulatory focus of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972
was to control livestock and poultry operations as a point source ofwater pollution
(Smith), even though agriculture is considered the greatest contributor to nonpoint
pollution. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAPO) are the only type of
agricultural production operation regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency or
the delegated states under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (Frarey
and Pratt). Under the NPDES all feedlots with more than 1000 animal units, and with a
discharge other than during the 25-year, 24-hour stonn event must obtain a permit. A
NPDES permit is also required for feedlots that have from 300 to 1000 animal units with a
direct discharge through a man-made conveyance or with a stream running through the
feedlot. Many states were granted authority by the EPA to draw up their own programs;
the required state manure management plans must be more stringent than the NPDES
program. CAFOs have been treated as relatively low priority compared to industrial and
municipal point sources, by the EPA and many delegated states. Small wonder that in
1992 less than 10 percent of the estimated 10.000 livestock operations sufficiently large to
be classified as CAPOs held NPDES permits (Frarey and Pratt). Among delegated states
there is considerabie discrepancy in the implementation of the NPDES program (Frarey
and Pratt, MueWing).
II
The most important issues in local control of livestock production include nuisance
complaints and right-to-fann laws, special protection districts such as agricultural areas
and, local land use controls such as county and municipal zoning (Hamilton). Although
right-to-farm laws are deemed necessary to protect farmers from mvolous civil suits, they
are being reauthorized by many states making them conditional on compliance with state
environmental regulations. In spite of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of
1995, agriculture as a non-point source ofwater pollution has remained largely
unregulated.
Socioeconomic Impact ofEnvironmental Regulations
in the U. S. Livestock Industry
Technology and the changing structure ofanimal agriculture have led to a call
from the citizenry for greater stewardship of the environment. The public is particularly
concerned about air quality, degradation of streams from nitrogen, phosphorus, and
pathogens and pollution ofground water from nitrogen (Christensen and Krause).
Farmers operate in a world ofshort-term economic pressures and fann programs that
emphasize maximizing present production, practices that ironically may not foster
environmental stewardship (Hamilton). Under a maze offederaJ, state and local
regulations, producers must manage farm resources to maximize profits while at the same
time ensuring that livestock wastes do not contribute to environmental pollution or exceed
permit standards.
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There are conventional arguments (Bartik) that regulatory costs are ,quite small
compared to other business costs such as labor costs, and hence do not play an important
roIe in business location. Bartik's own study ofmanufacturing pLants found no statistically
significant effect of state environmental regulations on the location ofnew branch plants.
Results from studies oflivestock operations are mixed. Although not conclusive, one
study (Mo and Abdalla) reports that state environmental policies were a significant factor
influencing hog production growth. Bartik, and Mo and Abdalla, used different proxy
variables as measures of environmental regulation, or the stringency thereof Another
study (Knutson, Outlaw and Miller), using a completely different methodology from
Bartik, and Mo and Abdalla, observed that for the vast majority of relatively profitable
dairi,es, EPA regulations have no adverse impact. The study, however, concludes that if a
dairy is already experiencing cash flow problems, compliance with EPA regulations could
push this farm over the brink into financial failure. Dairy farmers that are bringing their
farms into compliance with the new EPA standards couLd find it desirable to
simultaneously expand their dairy operations.
The regulated industry could implement environmental policy if the cost of
implementation is relatively low, and cost sharing practices are readily available (TlAER).
However such cost sharing practices may reduce profit margins for highly competitive
firms, and reduce the availability of capital for other functions of the firm. Agricultural
producers from all sectors are now suggesting that as price takers, they are generally
unabIe to pass on the costs ofenvironmental regulation to consumers of their products
(Davidson). Earlier studies (e.g. Meier) suggest that dairy farmers are no different from
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producers of the least regulated commodities in their inability to recover pollution control
costs from the market.
Several studies have focused on the shortcomings ofcurrent methods of regulating
polluting industries. Some ofthese studies (Harrington, Krupnik, and Peskin; Savage;
Thomas~) point to the ineffectiveness of existing programs for non-point source water
pollution abatement given the leading role ofagriculture as a non-point source in water
quality problems. Shortie and Dunn suggest that, ifpolicy transaction costs were set
aside, an appropriately specified management practice incentive should generally
outperform estimated runoff standards, estimated runoff incentives, and management
practice standards for reducing agricultural non-point source pollution. Hochmann and
Zilbennann advocate a predetermined quality target that may be obtained by imposing
taxes via an iterative procedure which eventually converges to a unique and stable
equiJibrium. This procedure is considered by some as an improvement on the Pigouvian
tax concept in pollution control.
It has been observed that impact studies in environmental regulation show
consistent results depending on methodology. According to Gray and Shadbegian growth
accounting studies generally find small impacts because compliance costs constitute a
small share oftotal costs, whil,e studies which use regression have often found significant
effects between regulation and productivity. Their own study of environmental regulation
in the pulp and paper, oil, and steel industries showed a strong connection between
regulation and productivity when regulation is measured by the plant's pollution
abatement expenditures. PJants with higher compliance costs had significantly lower
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productivity rates. Gollop and Roberts suggest that one effect on productivity growth of
environmental regulations is that it diverts much needed resources from the production of
marketable output to the satisfaction of emission constraints. Such regulations would
reduce the level of scale economies or, equivalently, reduce the cost benefits of large scale
operations. It remains to be seen how the hog industry could be affected when most of
the operations are small.
Environmental regulations are not only measured in monetary costs but also in
attendant unoertainty. One study (Vicusi) suggests that regulations influence current
enterprise decisions not only through their current output level but also through their
expected future level and the degree ofuncertainty regarding future regulatory policies.
But the impact ofregulations does not only stop at measurement effects. Regulations
impose constraints on the firm's choice of produetion decisions makes it harder to take
advantage ofnew innovations, cause finns to lower new investment by increasing
uncertainty or otherwise reduce the productivity ofother (noncompliance) inputs. Gray
suggests that the effect ofEPA regulations is relatively weak compared to those of OSHA
on productivity growth. Christiansen and Haveman evaluate the contribution of public
regulations to the slowdown in productivity growth. Their results show that federal
regulations were responsible for 12-21 percent of the slowdown in the growth oflabor
productivity in US manufacturing during the 1973-1977 period.
As earlier stated results on the impact of environmental regulation are in some
respects sensitive to the manner in which the model is specified. Barbera and McConnell
estimated a system of factor demand equations as opposed to the previous approach of
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total factor productivity, to allow including an important component offinn behavior,
factor demand. They also found out that environmental regulations slowed productivity
growth, and that the most heavily regulated industries experienced relativdy large negative
productivity changes.
Jorgensen and Wilcoxen analyzed the impact ofenvironmental regulations by
simulating the long tenn growth of the U.S. economy with and without regulation. The
sectors hardest hit by environmental regulations did not include agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries.. These remained largely unaffected or only moderately affected by environmental
regulations. However Conrad and Robinson envision declining international
competitiveness in the U.S. because ofenvironmental regulations.
Most of these studies, though highly relevant were done in industries other than
agriculture, where it has been consistently less difficult to measure or define environmental
regulations. While many have shown that environmental regulations significantly lower
productivity growth, some have suggested that environmental regulations may actually
facilitate economic growth. Meyers and Nakumura used a putty-clay model to show that it
is possible for increasingly stringent environmental regulations to cause more capital






This chapter covers sources ofdata and the analytical procedures employed. We
recognize that it is generally difficult to quantify measures ofenvironmental regulation
because of possible endogeneity of state environmental regulations and other policy
choices of state and local government (Bartik; Christiansen and Haveman). Christiansen
and Haveman even lamented the difficulty ofdefining such measures.
The focus of this study rests with the proxy variable for environmental regulation,
the Green Index, and its impact on growth in the hog industry. Developed by Hall and
Kerr during the period 1991/1992, this index which is shown in the table below, is
comprehensive, constituting 256 indicators which measure and rank each state's
'environmental health. A higher total index indicates low environmental quality, which may
in tum be due to non stringent enforcement of regulation, or the absence of it. This
should in turn have little or no adverse effect on the hog industry. To make our measure
ofenvironmental regulation more relevant we used only five years of annual data, from
1988 to 1992, aggregated for fifteen of the United States' major hog producing states.
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Table 2. The Green Index 1991/1992















South Dakota 6965 27
Wisconsin 5478 10
Source: Green Index: A State by State Guide to the National Environmental Health
1991/1992.
The Green Index represents a broad view of environmental quality and its 256
indicators evaluate the different consequences of how people machines and nature interact
across the nation (Hall and Kerr). A rank of 50 is the worst and rank 1 is the best.
But regulation itself may also exist in the fonn of taxation. For this study the
proxy for this variable is the farm real estate tax per $100 of farm real estate value.
Hog inventory is the total number of hogs in each state (breeding inventory and
marketing inventory). Changes in hog inventory measure hog industry growth. This study
will determine the effect of regulatory and taxation policies on size and location of hog
industries. Empirical evidence from the National Agricultural Statistical Services (NASS)
of the U.S. Department ofAgriculture suggest that there is differential growth in hog
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inventory across the u.s. Some have argued that there are considerable discrepancies in
regulations and enforcement among states (e.g. Pratt and Frarey, Muehling). These
analyses are based on the premise that applying environmental and taxation policies more
stringently leads to higher production costs, and lower profit margins. Consequently
livestock operations will thrive in states with lower regulatory burdens. With economies
of scale and specialization such operations will eventually become large and concentrated,
as they strive for profitability. Whether this is true or not is the object oftbis study.
Summary ofEnvironmental Regulations in
the U.S. Hog Industry
The matrkes in tabies 3 and 4 show a summary ofregulations affecting the hog
industry in ten hog producing states. When the Clean Water Act was first passed it was
intended to control non-point sources ofwater pollution. Hog operations would be
targeted under this regulation. The Environmental Protection Agency's National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit program was to be implemented by state agencies.
States would also be required to draw up manure management plans that were more
stringent than the NPDES program. The NPDES permit would be required for hog
operations with no less than 1000 animal units, and for operations with 300-1000 animal
units which have a direct discharge into U.S. waters. Zoning requirements should have
kept odor and nuisance problems in check. Under CAFO regulations one animal unit for
swine, is one swine (over 55 pounds) multiplied by 0.4. Therefore 1000 animal units is
equivalent to 2500 swine (over 55 pounds).
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The review did not exhaustively cover the current status ofregulations; it has only
been used to show some of the differences and similarities among the states reviewed. It
covers requirements for the permit system., and in some cases penalties for permit
violations.
There are state agencies responsible for environmental regulation. In some states
e.g. Arkansas, Georgia, and Pennsylvania the responsibility rests with multiple agencies.
This does not necessarily translate into more stringency ofregulation.
The EPA delegated CAFO pennitting authority to some states, and not to others.
NPDES (general) and state pennits are required in most states. Some states require that
hog farmers obtain multiple pennits: construction permits; operation pennits; wastewater
treatment permit; water use permit; etc. Although CAFO regulations recommend the
1000 animal unit threshold for NPDES permit requirement, many states have adopted
lower cutoff figures e.g. 750 swine (over S5 pounds) instead of2500.
For most states NPDES permit applications must be accompanied by a certified
pollution prevention plan. In many cases they detail design criteria for waste sites
included in the construction plan, require specific discharge information and evidence of
satisfactory formal training in waste management and odor control.
The EPA general permit does not require periodic reports from hog producers, but
some states e.g. Oklahoma, require these during operation, together with records of
operation. NPDES permits are generally issued for five-year periods, but state permit
lengths do vary among states. The one year permits are more common, but in North
Carolina, state permits are issued for time periods deemed reasonable by the Director of
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the Division ofEnvironmental Management. There are pennit application fees, generally
ranging from $10 to $150. In VIrginia, the applicant is only required to pay the cost of
public notices.
To ensure compliance with pennit requirements states also adopted fines for
violating both general and state permits. Violations range from making false statements to
willful disposal or negligence. Criminal negligence may lead to incarceration. Wastewater
removal and land application ofwastes are generally prohibited by many states under
permit requirements. Wastewater may not be discharged into U.S waters at all. The rates
for land application ofwastes may not exceed crop requirements. Land application is
generally prohibited when the ground is frozen, saturated, covered with ice or snow, or
when significant precipitation is expected within 24 hours. Manure and ponds solid
handling management plans should include lagoon location and storage and handling of
wastes at the confinement faci[ity.
Many states have enacted tax: policies that broadly exempt agriculture from
municipal and sales taxes. Hog operations may not be the primary reason for this, but they
are a significant beneficiary. Agricultural districting and right-to-farm statutes in a broad
sense protect livestock and other agricultural operations from nuisance suits. The states
of Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi are among those which had no agricultural districting
statutes.
There are regulations covering facility location in many states. In Oklahoma for
instance, hog facilities may not be located within watersheds; should be located at least
three miles from the outskirts of a municipality or one mile from ten or more occupied
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residences. In Kentucky no specific requirements exist, but the site must be approved by
the Division ofWater District Office. In almost aU cases facility inspection by authorized
personnel is carried out. It is shown in table 3 and table 4 that the differences in
environmental regulations affecting the hog industry are not profound. What may vary
greatly, though, is enforcement.
Data
Data for hog inventory, taxes, land values, land in farms, com production, price of
corn, and value ofhog were obtained from the National Agricultural Statistical Services
(NASS) of the USDA. In some cases we have had to deflate nominal monetary values by
the U.S. Consumer Price Index with 1990 as base year, over the period under review, to
obtain real monetary values. The Green Index was obtained from Hall and Kerr (Green
Index: A State-by-State Guide to the National Environmental Health), and state
unemployment figures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Other production
statistics used in this study were obtained from the USDA. Data for the state of
Oklahoma was excluded from the econometric analysis because during the period under
review (1988-1992), Oklahoma was not a major hog producing state. The USDA database






Table 3. Matrix of Environmental Regulations in tbe US Hog Industry (OK, AR, TX, GA, KY)
STATE 9KLAHOMA ARKANSAS TEXAS GEORGIA KENTUCKY
State agency responsible The Department of The Department of The Texas Natural Resource The Environmental The Natural
for regulating the Environmental Qllality Pollution Control and Conservation Commission Protection Division of the Resource and
environment Ecology and its oversight Department of Natural Re- Environmental
body, The Arkansas sources; The Natural Protection
Pollution Control and Resources Conservation Cabinet
Eco-Iogy Commission Service; The Georgia Soil
and Water Conservation
Commission
Under direct EPA Yes No Yes No No
jurisdictionl
Permit Approval General and state permit State permit; waste General and slate permit Slate permit; operation Construction
management; water use permit; water quality permit;
registration peonil; water use permit; operation permit
all operations exceeding (No discharge
NPDES requirements must and discharge
obtain Land Application permits)
SyStem (l AS) Permit
Size requirement 750 hogs; 300 cattle 750 hogs; 300 cattle 750 hogs; 300 cattle 750 hogs; 300 cattle; more No minimum for
than 1000 animal units fot no discharge
LAS permit permits; 750
swine for
dischanzl!
Pollution prevention plan Required as part of Evidence of satisfactory Required Waste control systems; D~sign criteria
application process formal lr'aining in waste specific discharge for waste sites
management and odor information included in
control required construction
... permit
Record kcepintl Required durin~ operation Required
Periodic reports Required during operation Not required under EPA
lZeneral permit
Environmental assessment ReQuired before approval Required before approval
Permit length General permit - 5 yr!; General permit - 5 ~. 5 years .
State oermit - I Yr.
-- - ._--
1 The EPA delegates authority to some states to enforce EPA regulations, and retains authority to do so in about 12 states.
N
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Table 3. Matrix of Environmental Regulations in the US Hog Industry (OK, AR, TX, GA, KY) (continued)
STATE OKLAHOMA ARKANSAS TEXAS GEORGIA KENTUCKY
Application fees 510-5150, depending on 5Iso for state permit
size for state nermit
Fines for violations
A. General permit --
J. False statement Max. 5I0,000 Max. $10,000 510,000 - 520,ooO/day and Up to $25,000
a criminal jail term of 2-4 per day
vears
2. Willful violations 52,500 - 525,Ooo/day 52,500 - $25,OOO/day
B. Slate permit
J. False statement Max.. 55,000 $2,Soo/day for individuals
to 51,000,000 for
or~anizations
2. Willful violations Max. 5100 52,SOO/day for individuals
to 51,000,000 for
or~anizations
3. Negligence 5200 - 51,000 1 violation _. --
Wastewater removal Prohibited if discharged
into US waters ---
Land application of waste No land application of Prohibited when soil is Wastes may not be applied Wastes may not be applied
wastes when ground is frozen, !lBturated, covered to land that is subject to to frozen ground or snow;
frozen or during rainfall with ice or snow, or when flooding, frozen. or snow immediately after n1infall or
Must be based on N- significant precipitation is covered., adjacent to water- within 12 hrs of forecasted
content of wastes and crop expected with 24 hours bodies or steeply sloping rain; liquid application
requirement rate should not exceed -
inch per hour --
Manure and pond SQlids Storage and land Management plan for Lagoons should be located
handling applica.tion may not cause storage and handling of a minimum of300 ft from
discharge or violation of ~wasteat neighboring dwellings,
waler quality confinement facility, and and should be cleaned out
site management plan for when 70% of its volume is




Table 3. Matrix of Environmental Regulations in the US Hog Industry (OK, AR, TX, GA, KY) (continued)
STATE OKLAHOMA - -- ARKANSAS TEXAS GEORGIA KENTUCKY
Regulations on reduction Terracing; retention of
--
storage and utilization of animal wastes on premises;
wastes treating rainwater falling
on waste as wastewater
Preferential agricultural Yes, agriculture is broadly Yes Yes Yes Yes
taxation CJf.empt from municipal and
sales taxes
Agricultural districting2 No Yes No No Applicable at
local level
Facility location Facility may not be located Facility may not be located Facility may not be lOCated Minimum buffet ZODe of 150 No specific
within water-sbeds; within 1,320 ft. of nearest in the Edwards aquifer It from treatment! requirements
should be located at least 3 ~upied dwelling. Buffer recharge zone; no storage lagoons to neigh- exist, but site
miles from ou~ of of SOO ft. applies to all prohibited location boring property lines, 300 must be approved
mllDicipality or I mile from other structures requirements within the ft. from edge of wetted field by the Division
the Of more occupied general pennit language to any habitable structure of Water Disbict
residences not belon2:lDll to ollCflltor Office
Inspection of facility EPA Director or duly EPA Director or duly Cormni$l!ioner ot Yes
authorized persotmel may authorized personnel may Agriculture or duly
inspect facility and records inspect facility and records authorized personnel may
inspect any facility at any
time
Riiht-to-farm statute3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes.. --
Source: National Center for Agricultural Law Research and Information, University of Arkansas School of Law.
2 Agricultural areas created by law to protect farming operations in these districts from nuisance actions. Could be used to protect farmland from
conversion to non-farm uses.
3 Legislation enacted to protect agricultural operations from nuisance suits when they have been in operation (or sometime and are deemed to be in
compliance with state regulations.
!'-J
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Table 4. Matrix of Environmental Regulation in the Hog Industry (Ne, MS, PA, VA, MO)
STATE NORTH CAROLINA MISSISSIPPI PENNSYLVANIA VIRGINIA MISSOURI
State agency responsible The North Carolina The Department of The Department of The Department of The Dtpartment
for regulating the Department of Environmental Quality Environmental Resources; Environmental Quality o(Natural
environment Environment, Health and the Environmental Quality Resources
Natural Resources Board
Under direct EPA No No No No No
iurisdiction4 --
Permit approval No permits required for NPDES permit; state NPDES permit; state State permit for discharge NPDES permit;
most producers, but wastewater treatment permits for manure (VPDES) and no discharge construction
registration is essential; permit; water lise permit management; Agricultural (VPA); General Virginia prnnit; operlltion
operation with <100 operations are permitted Pollution Abatement permit
animal units are dt:emed only if manure management Permit; water usage permits
permitted and should only requirements are not required for certain
follow best management followed thresholds
practices
Size requirement 250 hogs; 100 cattle 7SO hogs; 300 cattle 2500 hogs; 1000 cattle 7S0 hogs; 300 cattle 2500 hogs; 1000
cattle
Pollution prevention plan Animal waste management




Permit length Period of time deemed S yean S years fot NPDES permit 5 yean 1- S yean
reasonable by Director of
Division of Environmental
Manall.ement IDEM)
4 The EPA delegates authority to some stBtes to enforce EPA regulations, and retains authority to do so in about 12 states.
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Table 4. Matrix of Environmental Regulation in the Hog Industry (NC, MS, PA, VA, MO) (continued)
-_.
STATE .-NQRJH CAROLINA MISSISSIPPI PENNSYLVANIA VIRGINIA MISSOURI
Application fees OEM assesses fees, but SSOO Applicant pays for pUblic Dept of Natural
may not be higher than notice Resources provides






I. False statement UD to SlO 000
2. wHiM violations Up to S10,000 per day Up to $25,000 per Civil remedies of S500 for $25,000 per violation; Fines I1!J1ge from
for water quality violation first day of violation and willful violations arc $2,500 to S50,OOO,
violation; up to $5,000 SI00 for each additional day felonies and fines range and jail term for
for first offense in willful from $2,500 to $50,000 willful violations;





Land application of Must be approved in Wastes may be applied at Waste may Dot be applied to: Holders of VPA permits
waste advance by OEM after least 50 ft and 300 ft from frozen or snow covered land; may apply wastes to land
submitting requisite nearest adjoining land susceptible to flooding: under permit conditions;
information property line and within 100 ft of waterbodies; no statutory requirements
occupied dwelling slopes adjacent to fOT level of nutrients
resDectivelv waterbodies required
Manure and pond solids
handlinll
Regulations on Requirements for proper MlIIIIIl'C management plan for Regulations
reduction, storage and waste management livestock operations required spedfically de.scribe





Table 4. Matrix of Environmental Regulation in the Hog Industry (Net MSt PA, VA, MO) (continued)
STATE NORTH CAROLINA MISSISSIPPI PENNSYLVANIA VIRGINIA MISSOURI
Pn:ferential agricultural Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
taxation
Altficultural districtinKS Yes No Yes Yes Yes
FacUity location No less than 100 ft At lea.,t 1000 ft from Operators should cheek At least 25 ft from improved At least SO ft from
between waste facility nearest occupied local zoning roadways; 200 ft from dwelling; 100ft from
and state surface water dwelling and 300 ft from requin:ments occupied dwellings; 100ft water supply structure
adjoining property line from water supply wells; SO
ft from waterbodies; 2S ft
from Drooertv lines
Inspeetion of facility Commission is The Department of The Depan of Natural
authorized to inspect Agricultun: has the right Resources is authorized
private property at to enter any pn:mises to inspect facility
n:asonable times
Riltht.to-farm statue6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: National Center for Agricultural Law Research and Information, University ofArkansas School of Law.
5 Agricultural areas created by law to protect farming operation in these districts from nuisance actions. Could be used to protect fannland from
conve~ion to nOn-ranD uses.
6 :Legislation enacted to protect agricultura1 operations from nuisance suits when they have been in operation for sometime and are deemed to be in
compliance with state regulations.
Research Methods
The study uses pooled cross-sectional and time series data to estimate the
relationship between the dependent variables measuring growth in the hog industry, and
the independent variables. The approach assumes a random intercept to give an error
components (or varian,ce components) model that can be estimated by generalized least
squares. The influence of multiplicative heteroscedasticity makes the ordinary least
squares estimator biased and inefficient, although it is best linear unbiased for the dummy
variable estimator. The method proceeds by appropriately transforming the observations
and then applying ordinary least squares to the transformed observations. This method is
particularly appropriate where there are more cross-sectional than time series data
(Greene, Judge et al.).
The method outlined by Judge et al., and available in the SHAZAM Econometrics
Computer Program manual (pp.250-253), assumes the following general model:
(5)
K
Yil =Pli + LP.l:Xkll +e/I ,
.1:=2
where i=1,2, ... ,N; and t=l,2, ... ,T. It is assumed that PII are independent random variables
with mean PI· and variance O'~. They represent the intercept coefficient for the ith
cross-sectional unit, while the PI; represent the slope coefficient common to all cross-
sections. The dependent variable is Y/I' the Xk// are the explanatory variables and the ell
are independent and identically distribut,ed random variables with E[ell] =0 and
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YII =LAJD}• ... L,8..x llU +eu'
J~l "~Z
The DJ1 are known as dummy variables and can take values of 0 or 1.
Given that the N individuals constitute a random sample from some targer
population whose parameters we wish to learn more about we can express Ai in equation
5 as:
(7)
where E[ ,u1]=O; E[,uIZ]= u~. and [,u,,uJ ]=0 for i ~ j. We would also assume that ,ul are
not correlated with the eP' Thus equation 5 becomes:
(8)
K
Ylt =~. +LPtXkit + Ii; +elt ·
k",2
This is the error components model. It is assumed that the correlation is constant over
time and identical for all individuals. This model provides an unbiased estimator for the
variance (72.
p
To test the hypothesis that the individual components do not exist, that is III =0,
or u 2 =0, which makes the least squares estimator best linear unbiased, the Lagrange
p
multiplier statistic (Breusch-Pagan) may be used.
The entire procedure is summarized below as given in Judge et ai, (pp.479-490).
1. Estimate the dummy variable estimator.
2. Use residuals from the procedure above to calculate the disturbance variance.
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3. Observations in the individual means are used to calculate the least squares estimator.
4. Residuals from step 3 are used together with the disturbance variance to calculate the
variance of the random components.
5. The observations are transformed.
6. Estimate the estimated general~ed least squares estimator using the transfonned
observations.
Model Specifications
The impact of environmental regulations on the size ofhog operations is evaluated
by the model below:
(9)
FSIZEtl =A +ATAXF$u + APRODI/ +P4CPRICEII +AGINDEXj
+f3JJFARMSu +fJ.,LVALUE/t +/3"HVALUEjl +AURATE+eil •
In this model we regressed number of large hog operations (FSIZE) against farm
real estate taxes (TAXES), com production (PROD), price of corn (CPRICE), Green
Index (GINDEX) land in farms (LIFARMS) land value (LVALUE), Hog
value(HVALUE) and unemployment rate (ORATE). It is expected that the number of
large hog operations which for this study has been defined as aU operations with no less
than 1000 hogs, will vary inversely as farm real estate taxes, and the price of com. The
effect of the Green Index is expected to be positive because, unregulated, hog operations
will expand as far as economies ofscale pennit. Stringent regulation will decrease
profitability as well as the incentive to expand. Corn prices are input costs and higher
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input costs win only hinder growth and expansion. Com is a major input in hog
production. It is therefore expected that hog operations wiU thrive in those areas where
com is readily available, in spite of the possibility the cost of transporting feed to the farms
might be very low.
One of the best known product-factor ratios often used in agriculture as an
explanatory variable is the Hog-Com price ratio. This ratio has become less reliable as a
predictor of changes in hog production in recent years. This is probably due to the high
proportion of the total supply now originating on specialized farms, that are less inclined
to vary production from year to year. The cost offeed, represented by the price ofcorn
now makes up a smaller proportion oftotaI costs (Tomek and Robinson). A more
appropriate model would include com price and hog price as explanatory variables,
instead of the hog-com ratio.
Unemployment rate is a proxy measure for availability of labor. A high
unemployment rate in any area could imply available )abor. This effect is expected to be
positive.
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is a measure of entropy and a key explanatory
variable in market power studies (Golan, Judge and Perloff). It may explain the degree by
which industries dominat'e the economy. but more so, the degree by which firms dominate
the industry. United States government antitrust agencies have used such measures to
mandate the breaking up ofvirtual monopolies in many industries. Market concentration
is one measure which determines productivity in industries; its effect on structure and
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performance in the hog industry for instance may indicate how government policies impact
the industry.
The U.S. Department ofAgriculture data sets have five size groups (four in earlier
years) into which hog operations in each state are categorized: 1-99 head, 100-499 head,
500-999 head, 1000-1999 head and 2000+ head. For i firms in the industry, the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is calculated as:
where theMSrr are each finn's market share in the state's hog industry for the 1-99 head
category, 100-499 head category, 500-999 head category and 1000+ head category
respectively. The hm are the total number of firms per state per year for each of the four
categories listed above. In calculating the index ofconcentration by this procedure it is
assumed that finns in each category within each state are the same. They may however
differ across states. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ranges between 0 and 1, but is
always positive. The market shares sum up to one. The interpretation of the effects of
explanatory variables taken from the side of the producer, may be at variant with society's
and ultimately the policy makers welfare. For instance lower taxes, lower input prices,
and low level ofenvironmental regulation, or enforcement could result in increased
concentration, but might also encourage new entrants into the industry, given the
apparently low cost of entry. The market effect of new entrants is to reduce the market
share ofexisting firms. The result ofhigh concentration in many industries has in many
cases supposedly resulted to high output prices because of the firms monopolistic nature.
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The model below may be used to evaluate the role ofenvironmental regulation in
market concentration.
(II)
HHI j , =A +ATAXESi, + APRODu +P4CPRICE/l +A,GINDEX,
+ P6llFARMSj, +P7LVALUEt, + /3"HVALUEs, + P9URATE +eu ·
This model, using the same independent variables as in equation 9, has a measure of
concentration as dependent variable. Therefore the Green Index is expected to change
positively as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. On the other hand increases in taxes, and
prices of other inputs should discourage expansion and have the net effect ofdecreasing
the firms market share. These would show negative signs. Increased corn production
might imply the availability of more feed, when it is affordable. This variable is expected
to have a positive effect, since any expansion ofthe hog industry would only result to an
increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. A rise in employment would only come
about as a result of expansion.
The impact of environmental regulation on total hog inventory (THI) is estimated
with the regression shown below:
(12)
THIll =A + ~TA.XESII + APROD;I + /i.CPRlCEi/ + flsGINDEX;
+!36UFARMSil +/l,LVALUEu +f1sHVALUE/t +!39URATE +eil·
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The third model has the log ofhog inventory as dependent variable and the
previous set of independent variables. The Green Index should be positive while taxes and
corn prices will change inversely. Unemployment rate should be positive.
One disadvantage of the error components model is that it sometimes returns
negative variances. Under such circumstances the model may not be considered






As mentioned in the previous chapter the estimated generalized least squares
estimation procedure was used to estimate the error components model. The estimator
should be best linear unbiased, and appropriate.
Location ofHog Operations
Modell estimates the impact of environmental regulations on the size of hog
operations. This model might even explain the location oflarge hog operations. For this
study a large hog operation has been described as any operation with at least 1000 hogs.
Descriptive statistics suggest that there is an annual average of662 large farms
over the period under review and for fifteen states. This would be a small proportion of
the total number of hog operations according to the USDA data, even though they
probably account for more than fifty percent of total hog inventory.
The table below suggests that in 1992 only 17 percent ofU S. hog operations had




inventory in 1992, up from 31 percent in 1982 and 38 percent in 1987 (U.S. Census of
Agriculture). In 1992 these farms contributed 56 percent of the total hog and pig sales.
Table 5. Characteristics of Hog Farmers by Production Capacity, 1992
Item Less than 500 500-999 1000-2499
Percent offarms 60 23 14
Percent ofsales 23 2] 31
Average acres 466 659 692





The total number ofU S. hog farms could continue to decline but the number of
large hog operations might actually be on the increase, possibly reflecting the existence of
economies of size in the hog industry. This is underscored by the higher number of pigs
farrowed per litter for hog operations with 2000 head or more (8.775 in 1996) compared
to smaller hog operations. An important trend in u.s. animal agriculture is the move from
diversified farms to specialized farms. The ensuing specialization may now be reflected in
the larger and more efficient hog operations that exist. The observed trends might also be
because of producers' adoption of new technologies such as artificial insemination and
other improved breeding programs.
USDA rankings suggest that in 1996 Iowa was the nation's top hog producing
state; in fact it is the nation's all-time top hog producing state. North Carolina at the
second position appears to be growing faster than the other states. However, a recently
proposed moratorium on hog industry expansion in that state might be enough to cap
production at present levels, or possibly even reduce growth in the near future. Although
com as an input has been linked to hog industry growth in several states in the past, rapid
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expansions in states like Oklahoma, Arkansas and North Carolina might suggest that tbis
is no longer the case.
Table 6. States Share of Total Hog Inventory (percent)
1996 rank State 1988 1992 1996
1 Iowa 25.24 25.60 27.21
2 North Carolina 4.87 7.73 16.56
3 Minnesota 8.46 8.08 8.63
4 Illinois 10.10 10.14 7.83
5 Indiana 7.75 7.82 6.68
6 Nebraska 7.48 7.90 6.41
7 Missouri 5.14 4.90 6.23
8 Ohio 3.98 3.01 2.67
9 Kansas 2.70 2.47 2.58
10 Oklahoma 0.43 0.41 2.35
11 South Dakota 3.26 3.14 2.14
12 Michigan 2.25 2.20 1.78
13 Pennsylvania 1.75 1.80 1.69
14 Arkansas 0.97 1.39 1.47
15 Wisconsin 2.30 2.08 1.42
16 Georgia 2.18 1.89 1.42
17 Colorado 0.40 0.70 1.12
18 Kentucky 1.97 1.49 1.11
19 Texas 1.01 0.88 0.89
20 Tennessee 1.80 1.03 0.71
Source: USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports.
The proportion of total hog inventory in states like Illinois, Indiana, and Nebraska
appear to be on the decline, even though they still rank among the top ten hog producing
states. This might translate into reduced total inventory, perhaps a direct result of citizens
and political desire for a slowdown in hog industry growth, given the environmental
consequences ofunregulated expansion.
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The table below is 1992 data which confinn that there were more hog operations
in the U.S. corn belt (54 percent) than in all the other states combined.
Table 7. Characteristics of Hog Producers by RegioD t 1992
Item Lake Com Plains South South All Regions
States Belt States Atlantic Central
Percent of farms 14 54 17 10 6 100
Percent of sales 13 55 15 12 5 100
Average acres 418 492 935 449 398 548
Source: USDA, Farm Costs and Returns Survey, 1992.
The above may not be true for 1997. In fact Oklahoma, one of the fastest growing
hog producing states, ranked only 25 th in total hog inventory in 1992. In 1996 it was
ranked 10th . This is a reflection of the fact that hog operations may now be profitably
undertaken in states which did not traditionally grow a lot of corn, even though it is an
important feed component in the hog industry.
The effect of taxes on the number oflarge hog operations is negative but not
significant, as shown in table 8 below. The proxy variable is farm real estate tax per $ ]00
value of farm real estate value. Mo and AbdaUa found a significant relationship between
property tax per acre of fannland on hog inventory growth rate. Had it been significant it
would have suggested that higher taxes depress expansion of farms in the hog industry.
The effect of state environmental policy was positive as expected but not
significant. A high Green Index implies low environmental quality. The amount of
fannland and the level ofunemployment, a proxy for available labor, did not significantly
affect the number of large hog operations.
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Table 8. Regression of Number of Large (>999 head) Hog Operations on
Environmental Regulations
Explanatory Variable Estimated Coefficient
Farm Real Estate Taxes -20.57
(76.20)
Com Production 0.25 ***
(0.05)




Land in Farms 4.71
(6.16)
Land Values 0.34 *
(0.18)




(j2 for dummy Variable Estimator 6905.20
(j2 for EGLS estimator 2586.80
(j2 for random components 261024.70
R 2 0.45
Note: Single asterisk indicates significance at 10%; double asterisk indicates significance
at 5%; triple asterisk indicates significance at 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
It has been observed in previous studies that the "new large hog operations" are
becoming more concentrated and operating on smaller acreage, since they no longer
include crop production components to which livestock wastes are returned. The proxy
variable for available labor is not significant. Even though the amount of available labor
may serve to bring new businesses in an area, over a period of time, expanding farms
would employ more labor and possibly reduce the level of unernployment, instead.
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Land values were positive and significant. This implies that states with many large
hog operations had high land values. Hog values, as proxies for hog prices were
significant but negativ,e. As input prices there would be size expansion ofhog operations
if they were lower. Higher hog prices would reduce expansion. The coefficient for com
prices is also negative and significant at 10 percent. Given that com and hogs are two of
the most important inputs in the bog industry this model confinns that a significant
increase in the prices of inputs would have the expected negative effect on the number of
large hog operations.
But what this model shows is that probably the most important determinant in the
location of large hog operations is the quantity ofcom produced. This variable was
positive and highly significant. It has shown that large hog operations were mainly located
in areas where com production was high. Over this same period (1988-1992) USDA data
also suggest that there are more hog operations in the U.S. com belt than in an the other
regions combined. This translates into higher total hog inventory in this region. Thus feed
availability, as well as its costs would play an important role in where tbe large hog farms
are located, perhaps more than the present level of the state environmental policies.
With a coefficient of determination of0.45 the model itselfonly moderately
explains changes in the hog industry as they relate to the number of large hog operations.
Size Distribution ofHog Operations
Model 2 evaluates the impact of environmental regulations on size distribution of
hog operations. The measure of concentration used is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index
41
(lllII), as described by Golan et aJ. It was first calculated using USDA data sets on size
distribution ofhog operations. HHI is always positive but never greater than 1. For each
industry under consideration the finns market shares sum up to one. As the number of
small firms increases relative to the number of large finns the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index will decrease. The index of concentration increases as the number offirms in the
industry decreases for a given level of output. This, alternatively, implies that the market
share for each of these firms simultaneously increases. USDA data suggest that most hog
operations are still small. This study estimated that a typical hog operation in the 1-99
size category controlled only 1I100,000th of the total market share in the average hog
producing state.
Table 9. Characteristics of Hog Producers, 1988-1992
Category Average number Average number. Average size of Average
of head (per of finns (per operation (per market share
state) state) state) (per state)
1-99 head 183420 6365 29 11100000
100-499 head 984070 4144 238 1/10000
500-999 head 803960 1179 682 112500
1000+ head 1381100 662 2086 1/1000
Source: Calculated from USDA data; Average size of operation is measured in number of
hogs per operation.
Table 9 again confirms that the number of large (1000 or more head) hog
operations is small, but they contribute the highest inventory of hogs. The typical large
firm controls only 0.1 % of the hog industry in the average hog producing state; still
considered too small to largely effect market changes by its own non competitive
practices, or for antitrust intervention. These figures will differ for individual states.
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Results from econometric analysis suggest that fann real estate taxes per $100 of
farm real estate value was highly significant, but positive. The implication is that higher
taxes had the effect of increasing concentration in the bog industry. Market consolidation
may have occurred through mergers, buyouts, or the less competitive firms simply going
out ofbusiness because ofhigh operating costs reflected by high fann real estate taxes.
High operating costs should have the effect ofkeeping new low budget operations or
small firms out of the hog industry. Ifoutput level should remain constant, at least, the
market shares offirms remaining in the industry will increase.
The quantity of com produced was significant. The negative sign indicates that it
changes inversely as market concentration. One probable explanation is that the
availability of a very important feed component encourages new firms to enter the
industry. However the price ofcorn, and the price of hogs were not significant factors in
market concentration.
The level of unemployment is positive and significant. As proxy for available
labor, there appears to be an increase in the concentration index as labor becomes readily
available to undertake production operations. Since concentration means relatively large
fann sizes, the use of labor is bound to increase even if production operations are not
entirely labor intensive.
The variable measuring land value was not significant, but the amount of available
farmland was negative and significant. Again, the inverse relationship suggests that as
farmlands increase, the result is a decrease in the concentration index. The availability of
farmland may be a sufficient factor in new firm entry into the hog industry.
43
Table 10. Regression ofHHl on Environmental Regulations
Explanatory Variable Estimated Coefficient
FannReal Estate Taxes O.OlS."
(0.006)




Green Index 0.00002 • **
(0.000004)








CJ2 for dummy Variable Estimator 0.0009
(T2 for EGLS estimator 0.0002
(T2 for random components 0.0005
R 2 0.62
Note: Single asterisk indicates significance at 10%; double asterisk indicates significance
at 5%; triple asterisk indicates significance at 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
The measure of state environmental policies, the Green Index, is positive and
highly significant. Thus, a high Green Index changing directly as the measure of
concentration implies that state environmental quality is lower as the concentration index
increases and vice versa. Given that the concentration ratio is a measure of finn size, one
may opine that average finn size wiU be higher in states with poor environmental policies
or high Green Indices. The previous model did not have conclusive evidence on this
assertion, although the Green Index was positive. The 1000 animal unit threshold is
required for permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems
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program. It is however true that most states which have NPDES permitting authority also
have lower cUlt-off figures. The state ofKentucky, for instance, has no minimum
requirements for issuing a no discharge permit.
The model moderately explains variation in size distribution ofhog operations
""given a coefficient ofdetennination of0.62.
Total Hog Inventory
The tmrd model evaluates the effect of state environmental policies on total hog
inventory. To avoid scaling problems the natural log ohotal hog inventory was used as
dependent variable.
Fann real estate taxes per $100 value offarm real estate, is not significant, though
negative, as in one of the previous models. Also insignificant but positive are com prices,
land values, and unemployment rate. However in a study which used hog inventory
growth rate as dependent variable, Mo and Abdalla found out that property tax per acre of
farmland, and land value were significant. Land in farms was positive and significant. This
suggests that there is higher total hog inventory in states which have higher amounts of
available farmland. This might even be a reflection of the number of operations
established in such states, leading to the high total inventory.
Hog prices are significant but negative. Whether one looks at it from the
consumers or producers point of view, total hog inventory is higher in states which have
lower hog prices, or lower in states with higher hog prices. The problem of high input
costs in hog production comes into focus.
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Table 11. Regression ofTotal Hog Inventory on Environmental Regulations
Explanatory Variable Estimated Coefficient
Farm Real Estate Taxes -0.107
(0.092)




Green Index -0.0002 *.
(0.000099)









2 for dummy Vari.able Estimator 0.0058
0-
2 for EGLS estimator 0.0042
0-
2 for random components 0.1 S4
R 2 0.47
Note: Single asterisk indicates significance at 10%; double asterisk indicates significance
at 5%; triple asterisk indicates significance at 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Corn production is again highly significant and positive. Hog inventory would be
higher in areas that produce high amounts of corn and probably lower in other areas. This
agrees with USDA data showing that there are more hog operations and more hog sales,
therefore more total inventory in the U.S. corn belt. The measure ofenvironmental
regulation, or state environmental policies, is significant but negative. It implies higher
total inventory in states with higher environmental quality. Mo and Abdalla describe this
as counter-intuitive. Given that our measure ofenvironmental regulations is non-changing
over time it is impossible to determine its effe·ct over any appreciable length of time. One
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explanation is that high total. inventory may have led to more environmental regulations
and more stringent enforcement.
The model only moderately explains variations in hog inventory given a coefficient





Results as given in the previous chapter indicate the influence ofsome factors on
growth in the U.S. hog industry. Many studies have been undertaken on the impact of
environmental regulation on industries other than agriculture, apparently because ofthe relative
ease with which productivity could be measured in those industries. It still remains a difficult
task to quantifY or even define measures ofenvirorunental regulation, especially in the livestock
industry.
The U.S. Hog Industry
This study focused on a measure ofstate environmental policies, as the measure of
environmental regulation. This measure which is known as the Green Index. is a
comprehensive index of256 environmental indicators not only restricted to measuring
environmental quality in the livestock industly. This may have implications for explaining its
effect on the hog industry.
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The state environmental policy measure was not an important detenninant ofthe
number oflarge hog operations in each state. The cost ofcomplying with the requirements of
environmental regclations may be small in relation to other costs ofproduction. But this
measure ofenvironmental regulation should be directly measurable and directly related to the
livestock industry alone. This measure was however significant for total hog inventory and the
measure ofconcentration. The results may have been counter-intuitive in the fonner case, but
results from the latter case suggest that concentration is negatively influenced by environmental
regulation, reflected by increasing Green Indices. Hog inventory may have been higher in
states with higher environmental quality. What this study did not accomplish though is to
determine the relationship between concentration and total hog inventory i.e. whether high
concentration measures translated into high total inventory or not. A plausible explanation is
that regulations would have been implemented and enforced as a direct result ofenvironmental
degradation from livestock activities. The proposed moratorium on the hog industry in North
Carolina for instance, might be sufficient to keep its environmental quality in check, but that
state's total inventory will remain high in the near future.
It was observed that fann real estate tax calculated per $100 offarm real estate value
was not significant either in the case oflarge hog operations or total hog inventory. It however
showed a positive and significant relationship to the concentration index. Its actua1 effect may
have been to put small marginal firms out ofbusiness. USDA data suggest that average hog
farmers are now operating on smaller acreage than before because they abandoned the crop
production component oftheir integrated farms. Their spending on farm real estate would be
increasing because ofthe requirements ofthe new environmental regulations. Possibly, taxes
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levied on these pr:opertiesare small in relation to other production costs. Mo and Abdalla
found that property tax per acre offannland was significantly but negatively affecting the
growth rate in hog inventory. This could be misleading iffium sizes are actually decreasing.
Taxes are indeed a fonn ofregulation.
One very important factor affecting the hog industry is the quantity ofcom produced..
Corn being a major ingredient in livestock feed, this study found it positively influenced both
the size oftotal hog inventory and the number oflarge hog operations. Presumably a large
number oflarge hog operations are located. in the major com producing states ofthe U.S.;
these same states probably have the highest total hog inventories> because ofthe availability of
a major input. The effect ofcom production on concentration is significant but negative.
States with titde com production have a few large hog operations. Either small operations tend
to be unable to survive without much com production, or these states can only support
production ofa small number ofhogs, and these hogs are concentrated in a few finns because
ofscale economies
The quantity offannland significantly influenced total hog inventory, but not the
number oflarge fanns. The total inventory may include different operations, each ofwhich
requires a parcel ofland for operation. That the amount offannland does not influence the
number oflarge farms in a state is consistent with earlier observations that, even as per head
expansions are enhanced, the hog operations are now located on smaller land parcels than in
previous years. This is consistent with observations that the quantity offannland significantly,
but negatively, influenced concentration in the hog industry. Thus, as the quantity ofavailable
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fannlandincreases, the market share offinns in the industry decreases. Ifwe assume no
changes in demand and supply a reduction in market share implies a reduction in finn size.
Unemployment rate was used as a proxy variable for available labor to undertake fann
operations. It was only significant and directly related to the concentration index, implying that
increases in market shares may be triggered by the amount ofavailable labor. Its use as a
measure for available labor over any period oftime is questionable, because hog farms, whether
they are expanding or new, would employ some of that labor, and reduce the rate of
unemployment.
The hog-com price ratio is not an effective measure ofinput costs (fomek and
Robinson). It has been replaced by the actual input costs: the prices ofcorn and hogs. Com
prices have significant effects on the number oflarge operations but not on the total hog
inventory or the concentration ratio. Since producers can pass on production costs to
consumers in the form ofhigher prices, the decision to operate can be least affected, except
where such costs are prohibitive. The decision to expand may be different. According to the
results this may be negatively influenced by the price ofcom, and the price ofhogs.
Land values were used by Mo and Abdalla as proxy for general economic factors. This
variable perfonned consistently well in their analysis. In this study it positively influences the
number oflarge farms, but not total hog inventory, or the concentration index:, and agrees with








One important detenninant ofhog industry activity is the amount ofcorn produced; it
enables more firms to survive, thereby reducing concentration. It is also apparent that large as
well as small hog operations are mainly found in com producing areas. These are consistent
with findings that total hog inventory changes directly as the amount ofcom produced, even
though more recent evidence suggests that total hog inventory might be increasing in non-
traditional com producing states like Oklahoma. The models also suggest that com and hog
prices are important in the hog industry, but their effect on concentration is not quite explicit.
Higher input costs will negatively impact both total hog inventory and the total number oflarge
farms. The effect on individual finns possibly translates into higher production costs, which
will directly result to a reduction in finn size.
The effect ofstate environmental policies on hog operations is difficult to ascertain.
First, it had no influence on the total number oflarge hog operations, 3lthough consistent with
observations (Knutson, Outlaw, and Miller), that EPA dairy waste management regulations
had no effect on large profitable dairy farms. Second, it showed mixed results on total hog
inventory. Its effect was significant, but the relationship inverse, implying higher hog inventory
in states with high environmental quality. Ifstringent environmental regulation is expected to
reduce total hog inventory, stifle expansion in the hog industry and reduce the level of
concentration in the industry, the Green Index would be positive. This index positively
impacted the measure ofconcentration, lending credence to the probability that firm sizes
might actually increase under lax environmental regulation. The review ofsome state
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environmental regulations suggests that there is very little difference in available regulations
among states. Any differences in hog inventory, number oflarge hog operations, or the
concentration ratio attributable to regulation would be due to differences in enforcement, not
differences in laws. The case ofthe North Carolina hog industry is proofthat negative public
perception ofhog operations are the catalyst for legislative action. Third, the measure lS
available only for a point in time. It would have been more appropriate to use a variable that
measures regulation over time and space. Fourth, the measure is composite and includes non-
agricultural indicators. This problem could be avoided by omitting all but those indicators that
have direct relevance to livestock operations.
The Gr,een Index as a measure ofenvironmental regulation is probably inappropriate
for this study. It incorporates public attitude and policy decisions, and may be imprecise when
applied to this problem. An alternate measure more related to the hog industry should be used
in future research. Measures like state spending on water pollution abatement may be useful.
The more precise variable could provide better results. Future research should start by
identifying such a variable. Models that can include state policy measures may be more
appropriate in determining these effects. These policies might include measures of enforcement
or stringency ofregulations directly related to pollution by the hog industry.
Major hog producing states like Oklahoma should be even more careful in identnying
appropriate measures of'environmental regulations in the hog industry to be able to evaluate
their effect on the hog industry. It is still a difficult task relating such measures as state spending
on water pollution abatement, and environmental indices like the Green and Lester indices
directly to environmental degradation by the bog industry. The problem ofvarying degrees of
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stringency ofenforcing regulations among states, should make any measure more related to
stringency, than the number oflaws.
This study does not include pre-l988 chang~ except perhaps some effects from
periods closer to 1988; nor does it include changes that may have occurred after 1992. Further
studies may cover such periods.
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